Article | Funding Your Divorce: Costs Explained

It is well known that legal costs in divorce cases can easily escalate out of control, especially where proceedings continue over many months or even years. The recent divorce case of Xanthopoulos v Rakshina heard in the High Court is a perfect illustration of just how high these costs can be; described by Mr Justice Mostyn as “exorbitant”. Here we will take a closer look at the costs accrued in this case and what can be done to avoid such outcomes following separation.

What happened in the case of Xanthopoulos v Rakshina?

The case of Xanthopoulos v Rakshina, heard in the High Court in April 2022, concerned a Greek-born resident of Russia, Lazaros Xanthopoulos and his wife, Alla Aleksandrovna Rakshina. Ms Aleksandrovna is described in the judgement as the 75th richest woman in Russia with assets of over £300m and as holding a senior role with a Siberian supermarket. The parties married in Moscow in 2006 and separated in 2020. A Russian court agreed to the divorce in March 2021, but a financial remedy was not finalised at this time. Mostyn was highly critical of the parties on the basis that their filings missed the deadline set, and their skeleton arguments exceeded the 350-page limit by some 1,500 pages. On this matter, Mostyn stated:

“This utter disregard for the relevant guidance, procedure, and indeed orders is totally unacceptable. I struggle to understand the mentality of litigants and their advisers who still seem to think that guidance, procedure, and orders can be blithely ignored”. He also stated that he “struggled to find the language that aptly describes the exorbitance of the litigious conduct of the parties”.

The High Court was asked to consider a range of costs by the parties. In total, costs have amounted to between £7.2 million and £8 million, including £5.4 million incurred prior to the High Court hearing. This is eye-watering by any measure. Summing up his concerns about these costs, Mostyn stated:

“Figures like this are hard to accept even in a conflict between the uber-rich…to run up in domestic litigation costs of between £7 million and £8 million is beyond nihilistic. The only word I can think of to describe it is apocalyptic”.

Strong words indeed.

Explaining how the system could be improved to avoid such high legal costs in family law disputes, he recommended that statutory measures be put in place to limit the scale and rate of costs. Alternatively, he suggested that the Family Procedure Rule Committee need to find a solution to the problem.

Echoes of the past?

This case may remind some of the fictional inheritance case of Jarndyce v Jarndyce in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House. The plot of this imagined case concerned a vast inheritance and legal proceedings that went on for so long that by the end, the entire estate had been swallowed up in legal costs, hence rendering any final decision moot. Explaining just how futile the proceedings were in the first chapter of Bleak House, Dickens writes, “Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, over the course of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises”.

The story of Jarndyce v Jarndyce was itself inspired by historical examples of legal cases in which legal proceedings have gone on for decades, such as in the case of Sir George Downing in the late 1700s, which lasted for more than 40 years.

Admittedly, the more recent High Court case of Xanthopoulos v Rakshina did not lead to costs which exhausted the marital assets; it is nevertheless a reminder of just how far family disputes can extend if not kept in check.

How can divorce costs be kept under control?

The single most effective way to keep divorce-related costs under control while achieving a mutual and amicable outcome when it comes to financial and other agreements following divorce is to use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). ADR includes a range of non-confrontational methods of reaching an agreement even on highly complex matters, such as mediation, negotiation, and arbitration.

Family law Solicitors who are members of the organisation Resolution have the skills and training to resolve matters such as child and divorce disputes outside of the court system. Resolution was founded over 40 years ago and is made up of family Solicitors who advocate a non-confrontational approach to family law issues, providing a better outcome for families and their children.

Outcomes are often much better than traditional court-based litigation as parties are encouraged to work together to find a mutual agreement. This results in improved compliance with any outcome reached (i.e. a long term willingness to abide by what is agreed between the parties) and helps to preserve relationships for the benefit of any children involved in the proceedings.

Furthermore, in most cases where mediation, arbitration, or negotiation are used to reach a financial resolution following divorce, costs are typically much lower than traditional court litigation.

Final words

As Mostyn makes clear in his remarks in the case of Xanthopoulos v Rakshina, legal costs for divorce proceedings need to be capped or controlled in some way to prevent endless litigation, wrangling, and the excessive use of court time. As such, the courts do not offer the optimal route for such disagreements, even where settlements can reach millions of pounds. ADR methods such as those advocated by Resolution are not just for straightforward disputes of lower value; they are equally suited to highly divisive high-net-work divorce proceedings.

Edwards Family Law is a niche London-based firm specialising in complex family law cases following the breakdown of a relationship. We are members of Resolution, an organisation of Family Law Solicitors that abide by a Code of Practice that promotes a non-confrontational approach to family law practice.

To find out more about financial dispute resolution and financial orders following divorce, please phone +44 (0)20 3983 1818 or email contact@edwardsfamilylaw.co.uk. All enquiries are treated in the strictest confidence.

The meaning of “real need”, as interpreted by English courts in post-Radmacher divorce cases, is analysed by Joanna Blakelock and Kate Pooler, a partner and an associate solicitor at Edwards Family Law.

The Supreme Court case of Radmacher v Granatino [2010] 2 FLR 1900 still leads the pack for the validity of nuptial agreements. Upon divorce, the starting point is that all marital assets are shared equally, otherwise known as the “sharing principle”. Generally, the aim of a nuptial agreement is to “contract out” of the sharing principle and restrict financial claims on divorce to “needs-based” claims only.

Suffice to say, the English court is not bound to uphold nuptial agreements as a “contract”. However, Radmacher established the presumption that the terms of a pre-nup will be upheld and approved by a court. It therefore falls to the party who does not want to be bound by the agreement to argue why its terms should not be followed.

So, what is “real need”?

Radmacher decided that if a nuptial agreement left a former spouse in a “predicament of real need” then it would probably be unfair to hold the parties to that agreement. “Real need” was interpreted at a very low level in Radmacher and only required that a spouse was not left “destitute”.

Since Radmacher there has been relatively little guidance from the courts about the meaning of the phrase “predicament of real need” and where there has been guidance, judges have taken a range of views in this discretionary area.

One view: Fairness will not equate to near destitution…

In the 2016 case of WW v HW (Prenuptial agreement: Needs: Conduct), the couple’s pre-nup stated that neither party would have any claim to the other’s pre-marital, gifted or inherited property on divorce. Their relationship lasted 12 years and they had two children. The only joint asset was the former marital home which was worth GBP4.5 million, to which the wife had contributed 86% of the purchase price. The wife had inherited assets of circa GBP27 million.

“Radmacher requires the court to consider the pre-nup’s fairness in all the circumstances of the case at the time of the divorce.”

The judge made clear that the husband’s claim was limited to needs (on account of the pre-nup) but was concerned the husband would be left in a “predicament of real need” if the terms of the agreement were upheld.

The judge questioned whether the husband’s needs should be interpreted as “the minimum amount that is required to keep him from destitution” and whilst he judged that the presence of the pre-nup itself reduced the parameters of a needs award, this was not to the point of only saving the husband from destitution. He awarded him a housing fund of GBP1.7 million on a lifetime basis (with 45% of this sum reverting to the wife in 2027); a capitalised income fund of GBP215,000; and child maintenance payments of GBP18,000 per child, per annum.

Normal “reasonableness” considerations are still relevant

In the 2018 case of KA and MA (Prenuptial Agreement – Needs), the wife advanced a needs-based claim for GBP6 million (the pre-nup would have resulted in an award of only GBP1.6 million). In total, the judge awarded her GBP 2.95 million.

The judge said that Radmacher requires the court to consider the pre-nup’s fairness in all the circumstances of the case at the time of the divorce, which included the wife’s contributions to the marriage, the standard of living the family enjoyed, and which the husband (and the children whilst with him) would continue to enjoy. The judge was very careful to avoid too great a discrepancy between the children’s standard of living with each parent. These are the kind of “needs” considerations that would be taken into account in a divorce in the absence of a pre-nup. The judge awarded the wife a capitalised income fund for life at a rate of GBP100,000 a year (albeit with a 25% step down when the parties’ child reached the age of 21 or completed tertiary education). It is noted that she would have ordered GBP150,000 a year had the pre-nup not existed, demonstrating the role of a pre-nup in constraining a “needs based” claim.

Another view: a nuptial agreement should not markedly reduce a normal “needs” assessment…

In the more recent 2019 case of Ipekçi v McConnell another judge took another view. The couple had a pre-nup which, if upheld, would not have left the financially weaker party (the husband) “destitute” on divorce, but would have meant that his financial situation would be seriously strained.

The wife was an heiress with beneficial interests in trusts in the United States worth around USD65 million. The judge went beyond Radmacher, stating that he did not think that a valid pre-nup should result in a needs assessment that is “markedly less than needs assessed in ordinary circumstances. If you have reasonable needs which you cannot meet from your own resources, then you are in a predicament.” In any event, the judge deemed that the pre-nup fell short of compliance with the Radmacher principles and decided not to hold the couple to its terms. The husband was awarded a lump sum of GBP1,333,500.

The law is still uncertain; protect yourself

There remains uncertainty and inconsistency in the exercise of judicial discretion when it comes to the interpretation of Radmacher.

Nonetheless, if the effect of the proposed terms is designed to satisfy the financially weaker party’s housing and income needs, taking account of a reasonable standard of living, then the terms are likely to be considered “fair” and will be upheld by the court. Put another way, if the pre-nup inadequately provides for the financially weaker party, the agreement is unlikely to be worth the paper that it is written on and could lead to costly litigation, which undoes precisely the certainty that is initially sought. It is important to get the balance right.

Nuptial agreements certainly have a place in today’s family law climate, serving an important function of certainty and security for both parties. It is crucial to take early legal advice on the personal circumstances of individual cases. Enough time should be left for sufficient disclosure to be produced and shared, for adequate advice to be provided to the financially weaker party, and for negotiations to take place.

One of the most contentious issues in high net worth (HNW) divorce cases is the continuing payment of school fees. Often this is because when a couple divorces, the income of both parties reduces, making it much more difficult to cover private school fees. In the recent case of de Renner v Galbraith-Marten [2022] EWFC 118, The Hon. Mr Justice Mostyn ruled that a King’s Council did not have to pay for his daughter to attend private school. The father’s other two children attended state school, as he himself had done as a child, and the court accepted that the father could not afford private school fees for all three children. Furthermore, the father had never intended for any of his children to be educated privately.

The Hon. Mr Justice Mostyn concluded:

“The mother has emphasised to me repeatedly that the father was deprived of parental responsibility in Australia (but not here) and that accordingly, in her opinion, hers is the only parental voice that should be heard on the question of education. The father should have no say or other input, according to her, other than to pay. In my judgment to force him to do so would be a gross injustice which I am not prepared to contemplate.”

The issue of who pays for private school fees following a divorce is a serious one when considering the welfare of the child. For example, if they are already in a private school, being removed and enrolled in a state school adds to the instability already generated by the divorce itself. On the other hand, the older and more settled the child is at their private school, the greater the scope for potential harm.

Is private schooling a ‘need’ in terms of a divorce financial settlement?

As we have previously mentioned, the court must consider all the factors under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 when deciding the outcome in a financial remedy application in the event of a divorce or dissolution. These factors are:

The resources available to the parties, both capital and income, being both extant or reasonably foreseeable;

The financial needs of each party, considering the needs of dependent children and any disabilities; The duration of the marriage and the age of the parties;
The conduct of the parties (but only in exceptional circumstances);
The standard of living enjoyed by the parties;

Any benefit either party will lose as a result of the divorce; and
The contributions of each party to the marriage (both financial and non-financial).

Although, in an ideal world, it would preferable to be able to say more categorically whether or not private schooling is viewed by the court as a ‘need’, it is simply not possible to do so. This is because the court will look at all the facts relating to the matter, for example, the financial situation of both parties now and in the future, both in terms of income and capital, the intentions of both parents regarding private education and the age of the child (or children) and how settled they are at their existing school.

How can I ensure that my ex-spouse pays all or part of the private school fees?

If possible, it is always preferable for couples to work out a financial settlement following divorce between themselves. This can be done through negotiation between themselves or with the assistance of solicitors, and can be assisted alongside by the process of mediation. This can be much quicker and cheaper than going to court. Another great advantage of keeping the matter between the parties and out of court is that alternative dispute resolution methods are confidential, thereby safeguarding your child’s privacy.

If your child (or children) are old enough, you may wish to consider child-inclusive mediation. This would provide the children with the opportunity to attend mediation to express their own views on their schooling, and how any

changes, either to fee- or nonfee-paying education, might affect them. Whilst their comments and views would not be binding on the parents following those discussions, it can be a powerful indicator to parents as to their children’s wishes and feelings in the context of the matter as a whole, which can sometimes crack the case one way or another.

As members of Resolution, we are committed to helping HNW couples resolve their family law disputes in a respectful, non-confrontational manner. Mediation and other alternative dispute resolution methods provide a way to communicate effectively on important matters, such as your child’s education, and reach an agreement that is beneficial for the entire family in the midst of what is often a very difficult period in the family’s life.

Once an agreement is reached, our family law solicitors can present it to the court and have what you have agreed made legally binding in the form of a Consent Order.

If you require advice on paying school fees following a divorce, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Edwards Family Law is a niche London-based firm specialising in high-net-worth divorce, separation, and international family law matters. To find out more about divorce and financial settlements, please telephone +44 (0)20 3 983 1818 or email contact@edwardsfamilylaw.co.uk. All enquiries are treated in the strictest confidence.

In a social climate which sees fewer and fewer couples deciding to get married, or enter into civil partnerships, the subsequent separation of cohabiting parties is causing increasing difficulty in circumstances where they are simply not afforded the same financial rights on separation as divorcing couples or in the dissolution of partnerships.

Despite considerable pressure from family law solicitors, barristers, and judges, and family law groups such as Resolution, there is still reluctance amongst politicians to change the law in England and Wales so that it recognises the legal rights of cohabiting couples.

For unmarried parents who require financial provision to provide for their children following the end of a relationship with a high net worth (HNW) person, there is some light at the end of the tunnel.

Alongside an application for child maintenance to the Child Maintenance Service (CMS), an application for financial provision for the benefit of the child(ren) of the family can be made under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989.

What does Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 say?

Schedule 1 provides the Court with limited powers to make financial provision available for the benefit of the child(ren) of a relationship, where the parents were not married and have subsequently separated.

Needless to say, Schedule 1 also comes into play in circumstances where a child has been born to a mother, even after a very brief or fleeting relationship with the father.

It is possible to apply for the following orders:

Periodical monthly maintenance payments for yourself on the child’s behalf (or to an adult child directly, where applicable);
Secured periodical payments for yourself on the child’s behalf (or to an adult child directly, where applicable);
Lump sum for yourself on the child’s behalf (or to an adult child directly, if applicable);
Settlement of property for the benefit of the child, reverting to the paying party at the end of a specified term; and/or
A transfer of property outright to you on the child’s behalf (often held on trust for them) (or to an adult child directly), but this is only likely to happen in very specific and limited circumstances.

Who can make an application under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989?

The Court can make a periodic payment order in respect of:

Topping up the CMS maximum assessment amount, if the non-resident parent’s income is greater than £156,000 gross per annum. The Court will need to be satisfied that the circumstances of the case make it fair and reasonable for a top up order to be made;
A regular payment for school fees or vocational training; and/or
Meeting any reasonably foreseeable recurring expenses associated with the child’s disability (if they have one).

When would a Schedule 1 lump sum order be made?

Lump sum orders can be made by the court for the purposes of enabling liabilities and expenses already incurred in connection with the child to be met. These can even include the costs of their birth in some circumstances, or costs more generally which have been incurred in maintaining the child, even where those expenses were incurred prior to the application (as long as the application is made without unreasonable delay).

Specific future expenses and foreseeable liabilities can also be claimed. Whilst the court’s discretion is wide, the welfare of the child is paramount. Provision might be made, for example, for furniture for a new home purchased for the benefit of the child, a car to transport the child, or indeed a sum to be invested for future school fees. Lump sums are not, however, designed to be maintenance ‘by the back door’ for the resident parent.

How does the Court decide whether an order should be made?

The welfare of the child is a paramount consideration of the court in deciding these cases, and the standard of living enjoyed by both of the parties to the proceedings will also be considered. If, for example, the non-resident paying party is very wealthy and enjoys a luxurious standard of living, incredible accommodation, designer clothes and numerous international holidays each year, the court is likely to want to see the child’s standard of living when they are with the resident parent to be comparable, and will look at their suggested ‘reasonable needs’ in light of this.

The Court will also consider very similar factors to those listed under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, namely:

The child’s financial requirements;
Any physical or mental disabilities relating to the child;
The current and future income, earning capacity, and financial needs and obligations of the parents;
How long the child is expected to be in education or vocational training;
The income, earning capacity, and property of the child; and
The way the child was being or is expected to be educated.

How long do Schedule 1 orders last?

Unless the child is attending further education or vocational training, or has a disability, periodic payments will usually end when the child turns 18 years. If the paying party dies during the term of payment, the direct payments will of course stop, but whilst an existing order is in place, and if the child remains a dependent of the paying party, an application can be made under the Inheritance Act 1975 for a claim against the deceased’s estate.

If property has been settled or transferred, it will normally be returned to the financially stronger party once the child turns 18 or finishes their secondary education, but will sometimes only revert once the youngest child finishes their tertiary education. If special circumstances apply, such as an adult child with a continuing disability, the term might be even longer still.

Where does this leave us?

Applications for orders under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 are normally extraordinarily complex and require the advice and representation of a family law solicitor experienced in HNW separation.

At a high level, these types of cases tend to involve people in the public eye where privacy is also a significant issue to weigh and manage. It is vital to instruct a law firm that understands the need for strict confidentiality and can manage media enquiries. Edwards Family Law can also support you through private processes of dispute resolution, outside of the more public court proceedings, with processes such as mediation, Early Neutral Evaluation, private FDR hearings, and Arbitration.

To discuss any points mentioned in this article, please contact our office.

Edwards Family Law is a niche London-based firm specialising in high-net-worth divorce and international family law. To find out more about Schedule 1 application, please phone +44 (0)20 3983 1818 or email contact@edwardsfamilylaw.co.uk. All enquiries are treated in the strictest confidence.

According to the UK’s society magazine, Tatler, cryptocurrencies have been dubbed the new ‘Cayman Islands bank account’ for high-net worth (HNW) individuals attempting to hide their assets in divorce proceedings.

The lack of domestic and internationally cohesive regulations around cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, and the fact they are held in ‘digital wallets’ which can prove difficult to trace back to a specific person, means that crypto can provide a cunning vehicle for concealing wealth.

Family law solicitors specialising in international and HNW financial proceedings on divorce have been swift to get to grips with the legal issues surrounding cryptoassets and divorce financial settlements.

What are cryptoassets and cryptocurrencies?

Cryptoassets are digital representations of value that you can transfer, store, or trade electronically. As well as currencies, cryptoassets include non-fungible tokens (NFTs).

Cryptocurrencies are purely digital and use a peer-to-peer system and blockchain to undertake and record transactions. Cryptographic keys are stored in ‘wallets’ which are managed by a centralised crypto exchange (CEX).

There are several different types of cryptocurrencies, however, the most widely used and well known are Bitcoin and Ethereum.

Cryptocurrencies sit outside central banks, regulatory authorities, and governments. At present, they are unregulated, although there are moves to rectify this in many parts of the world, including the UK, Europe, and the USA.

Can cryptoassets and/or currencies form part of a divorce financial settlement?

Yes, and therefore any cryptoassets held by a party to a financial settlement proceedings on divorce must include them when making a full and frank financial disclosure. Although cryptocurrencies are notoriously volatile, the courts do have methods and expertise at their disposal to undertake valuations and assess their values.

What can I do if I believe my spouse is hiding cryptoassets?

Cryptocurrency can be difficult to identify and trace because there is no centralised ownership register for cryptocurrency assets. A specialist forensic expert may therefore need to be instructed to establish where cryptoassets are being held and to determine their approximate value.

Although it is widely believed that cryptocurrencies are anonymous, they are in fact more transparent than most people realise. Currencies such as Bitcoin do not have a centralised authority to provide identifying information, however, most cryptocurrency blockchains are public, meaning anyone with the required expertise can track an entire transaction history.

If you believe your spouse is hiding cryptoassets, it is possible to apply for a freezing order to prevent them from dealing with or disposing assets, including cryptocurrency, for a period of time. Whilst the freezing order is in place, a solicitor can instruct an expert such as a forensic accountant to trace and value your spouse’s cryptoassets. Freezing orders can only be applied for in limited circumstances and there are strict costs warnings which need to be considered ahead of issuing such proceedings.

Sometimes, cryptoassets cannot be traced. In such circumstances it may be possible to persuade the court that your spouse does possess cryptocurrency by providing evidence such as crypto wallet transactions or bank statements showing dealings in cryptocurrencies.

If the suspected cryptoassets cannot be traced but there is substantial evidence to show that they exist, the court has the power and ability to attach a notional value to the cryptocurrency and account for it as a matrimonial resource to be divided between you and your spouse. After considering all the factors contained within section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the court will decide how the property and assets of the marriage are to be divided, and this can include untraceable cryptoassets.

Concluding comments

Across the civil, criminal, and family courts, the judiciary has moved quickly to ensure that those adversely affected by the hiding and/or fraudulent dealings in cryptoassets receive access to justice. This is a fast-paced area of law, in which technology can rapidly outstrip legal remedy. In financial settlement cases on divorce, especially those involving significant assets and/or an international element such as obtaining a divorce in a foreign jurisdiction, securing advice from an experienced and specialist family law solicitor can make a significant difference to the outcome of your financial settlement.

Edwards Family Law is a niche London-based firm specialising in high-net-worth divorce and international family law. To find out more about divorce and financial settlements, please phone +44 (0)20 3983 1818 or email contact@edwardsfamilylaw.co.uk. All enquiries are treated in the strictest confidence.

At a date to be as yet confirmed (likely to be 6 April 2022), divorce law in England and Wales will catch up with most other common law jurisdictions by saying goodbye to fault-based divorce. And for almost all family law judges, barristers, solicitors, and campaign organisations, the coming into force of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act (DDSA) 2020 cannot happen soon enough.

The Government called for consultation on removing the need to claim the divorce was one party’s ‘fault’ following the highly-publicised 2018 case of Owens v Owens. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that, because the wife had not proven that her husband’s behaviour was ‘unreasonable’, she could not divorce her husband until the pair had been separated for five years.

Because so few divorces are contested, the public was shocked to discover that under English law, one spouse could force the other to remain married to them. David Gauke, the Justice Secretary at the time Owen v Owen was decided declared that divorce law in England and Wales was “out of touch with modern life”.

What are the current grounds for divorce in England and Wales?

At present, the only ground for getting a divorce is that the marriage has irretrievably broken down for one of the following reasons:

Adultery
Unreasonable behaviour
Desertion
You have lived apart for more than two years, and both agree to the divorce
You have lived apart for at least five years, even if your husband or wife disagrees

What is are the new grounds for divorce under the DDSA 2020?

Under the DDSA 2020, neither party has to ‘blame’ the other for the marriage breaking down. Instead, one or both parties simply need to make a statement that the relationship has irretrievably broken down. There is no scope for one party to contest the divorce in order to prevent it. The Court must accept the individual’s or couple’s statement that the marriage has irretrievably broken down and make a divorce order.

Allowing for joint divorce applications provides a foundation for couples to complete divorce negotiations around the financial settlement and arrangements for children amicably.

What other changes to divorce law will come into force when the DDSA comes into force?

There DDSA 2020 makes several other changes to divorce law in England and Wales, including:

· The time between the start of proceedings and the granting of the Conditional Divorce Order (Decree Nisi) is 20 weeks. This is to allow couples ample time to make arrangements regarding their children and finances.

· The terms Decree Nisi and Decree Absolute have been replaced with Conditional Divorce Order and Final Divorce Order to make the language of the divorce process friendlier and easier to understand.

The new divorce laws will not necessarily make the process of ending your relationship any easier. However, being able to file a joint petition or filing a petition on your own without needing to list factors of unreasonable behaviour or cite adultery mitigates the risk of you and your spouse becoming hostile towards each other from the start. No one likes to be blamed for a relationship ending. Removing the need for fault to be assigned to one spouse by another is a significant step forward, bringing family law in England and Wales in line with modern expectations and other common law jurisdictions.

Should I wait until the new divorce laws come into force?

At the time of writing, no date has been set regarding the DDSA coming into force outside of the loose ‘6 April 2022’. For some people, especially in high-net-worth and/or international divorce, waiting until later in the year to start divorce proceedings may not be in their best interests.

If you are considering divorce, it is essential to speak to an experienced Family Law Solicitor.

Ending a marriage is emotionally, legally, and financially complex. Just the presence of so much change is enough to make the process highly stressful for many adults and children. A Family Lawyer can listen to your situation, help you establish what you need and want out of the divorce to secure your financial future, and advise you on every related matter, including whether you should delay filing your petition until the DDSA 2020 comes into force.

Edwards Family Law is a niche London-based firm specialising in high-net-worth divorce and international family law. We are members of Resolution, an organisation of Family Law Solicitors that abide by a Code of Practice that promotes a non-confrontational approach to family law practice.

To find out more about no-fault divorce, please phone +44 (0)20 3 983 1818 or email contact@edwardsfamilylaw.co.uk. All enquiries are treated in the strictest confidence.

Many people believe that unmarried couples who live together (known as cohabitees) enjoy the same legal rights and protections as those that are married, but they are mistaken.

There is no such thing as a ‘common law’ marriage under English law and despite cohabitation being the fastest growing family type in England and Wales, if the relationship breaks down, cohabitees have to rely on complex property and trust law principles. Unmarried couples also have no automatic right to inherit under the rules of intestacy.

Last month, the Women’s and Equalities Committee (WEC) published a report on the rights of cohabitees. WEC made clear that the current law did not reflect the reality of the many diverse types of family structures in 21st century Britain and identified the need for urgent reform.

What were the main findings of the WEC Rights of Cohabitee’s Report?

The WEC received 380 written submissions from the general public, legal academics, legal practitioners, and campaign groups. The report’s key findings include:

A 2019 British Social Attitudes Survey showed almost half (46%) of the total England and Wales population wrongly assumed cohabitants living together form a ‘common law marriage’. This false belief leaves many cohabitees in shock when they discover how little legal protection is provided to unmarried couples who live together.

Unmarried couples have no automatic right to ownership of each other’s property if their relationship breaks down. Because they are forced to rely on property, trust, and contract law, the outcomes of court decisions are uncertain and case specific. Generous outright capital provisions that can occur in financial settlements upon divorce are not readily available to cohabiting couples. There are also very specific costs consequences in such cases.

As the general law prioritises financial contributions over domestic contributions, most witnesses called by the WEC argued that the financially weaker partner in a cohabiting relationship often ends up with nothing following a relationship breakdown.

Current law does not allow for caring and non-financial contributions to be considered by the court, prohibiting judges from crafting more effective remedies.

Although there is the option of creating a cohabitation agreement, this can be “emotionally and practically difficult”. Dr Charlotte Bendall, Lecturer in Law at Birmingham Law School, provided evidence

showing that when couples were seeking to make decisions as to finances there was “little to suggest that people are acting on the basis of a knowledge of the law, or even that they are aware of what the law is”.

Did the WEC provide any recommendations?

Suggestions for improving the law to protect unmarried couples who live together include:

The law must recognise the “social reality of modern families” and provide legal protection whether couples choose to marry, enter into a civil partnership, or live together. However, marriage should still be

recognised as holding important social and religious status in England and Wales. Therefore, the Law Commission’s 2007 proposals for an opt-out cohabitation scheme provides a sensible approach to reforming cohabitation law.

There needs to be a public information campaign aimed at educating people on the fact that ‘common law marriage’ does not exist. The public needs clarification on the legal distinctions between marriage,

civil partnership, and cohabitation, and the risks of wedding ceremonies that do not meet legal formalities.

The Law Commission’s 2011 recommendations concerning intestacy and family provision claims for cohabiting partners should be immediately implemented.

At present, financial settlement solutions such as spousal maintenance, pension sharing or off-setting, and the requirement for the court to consider all the factors under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1974 are not available to couples that live together, unless they have specifically made provisions in a legally binding cohabitation agreement and taken independent legal advice.

High-net-worth cohabitee relationship breakdowns often result in one partner being left financially vulnerable. If you and your partner have, or are considering separating, it is vital that you obtain legal advice from a specialist and experienced family law practitioner.

As Resolution members, we remain constantly alive to changes in family law and will keep you updated as to the uptake of the WEC’s recommendations.

Edwards Family Law is a niche London-based firm specialising in high-net-worth divorce and international family law. To find out more about cohabitation law, please phone +44 (0)20 3983 1818 or email contact@edwardsfamilylaw.co.uk. All enquiries are treated in the strictest confidence.

Whilst the Supreme Court decision in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 held that weight should be given to a nuptial agreement it does not follow that such agreements will always be upheld by the court.

This was illustrated by the recent case of SC v TC [2022] EWFC 67, in which His HonourJudge Hess placed no weight on a post-nuptial agreement in financial remedy proceedings. He concluded that its terms were unfair due to the husband’s vulnerability at the time of signing and that the agreement would leave him in “a predicament of real need”.

Before examining the case, it is useful to briefly state the current law around the enforceability of nuptial agreements.

What makes a nuptial agreement legally enforceable?

The Radmacher decision states that the court will give weight to a nuptial agreement provided it is fair to do so, with ‘fair’ being the operative word. The Supreme Court referred to other landmark cases when deciding Radmacher, including McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, in which it was established that fairness should be based on the principles of:

need compensation sharing

The Court will also apply a three-part fairness test concerning the nuptial agreement;

that the agreement was freely entered into (i.e. there was no undue pressure),
both parties understood the agreement (i.e. there was financial disclosure before the agreement was signed and both parties received or had the opportunity to receive independent legal advice), and
it is reasonable to hold both parties to the agreement (i.e. it is fair and the prevailing circumstances).

What were the facts in the case of SC v TC

The couple married in 1994 and had one child. The husband (H), worked in investment banking but had stopped after being diagnosed with early-onset Parkinson’s disease. From around 2003, H began to experience the early effects of his illness. He was formally diagnosed in 2011 and by 2013, the marriage was unhappy and lacked sexual intimacy. H visited a sex worker and later told the wife (W). W asked for a divorce, however, H asked for another chance to make the marriage work. W agreed on the condition H enter into a post-nuptial agreement to ensure her financial security.

Although the terms of the nuptial agreement were significantly more generous than what the court would award, H signed the contract. H’s solicitor told him the division of the financial assets was 80/20 in favour of W and recorded that he had advised H that it would be financially imprudent to agree to these terms. H stated that given his prognosis it made no sense for him to fight for assets and he, therefore, would not contest these terms of the post-nuptial agreement.

The post-nuptial agreement was signed in 2014 and divorce proceedings began in 2020. H wanted the marital assets to be divided evenly. Unsurprisingly, W argued that the post-nuptial agreement terms must be adhered to when alighting upon a financial settlement.

Why did the court not uphold the post-nuptial agreement?

Although His Honour Judge Hess concluded there had been financial disclosure, legal advice and both parties

were, when signing, mature and intelligent, he was concerned that the post-nuptial agreement disregarded any needs arising from H’s Parkinson’s diagnosis, including housing needs and home care requirements. The agreement would leave H in a position of “a predicament of real need”, with W comfortably provided for, and this would be fundamentally unfair.

His Honour Judge Hess stated:

“In summary on this area of the case, I have reached the conclusion that it would be wrong for me to place weight on the Pre-Marital Agreement. Not only was it very much to the husband’s disadvantage in financial terms, I have reached the overall conclusion that, at the time that it was signed, he was a vulnerable person (in the ways described above) and the wife rather took advantage of that vulnerable situation to gain a substantial financial advantage.”

Concluding comments

This decision highlights that even if all of the formalities required have been adhered to, fairness will always be the court’s primary consideration. The court fulfils a vital role in protecting vulnerable parties in situations of this kind and prevents a contracting out of the fundamental principles of English family law. In many cases, it is difficult or impossible to predict the situation a couple may find themselves in at the time of divorce, be that children, illness or otherwise. However, rather unusually in this matter, the husband’s future was a lot clearer given the reasons that the agreement was entered into. Therefore, when entering into a pre or post nuptial agreement, parties and their advisors must ensure that the agreement being entered into is in fact worth the paper that it is written on. A keen assessment of the likelihood that a court will deem the terms unfair is therefore essential to achieving the desired outcome.

Edwards Family Law is a niche London-based firm specialising in high-net-worth divorce and international family law. To find out more about pre and post-nuptial agreements, please phone +44 (0)20 3 983 1818 or email contact@edwardsfamilylaw.co.uk. All enquiries are treated in the strictest confidence.

The Family Court In England and Wales has come under fire for being a “desert island” in the justice system, shrouded in secrecy and making its decisions behind closed doors. In October 2021 the then president of the Family Division, Sir Andrew Macfarlane, acknowledged that “justice taking place in private…is bound to lead to a loss of public confidence”. He called for the Family Court’s rules on transparency and reporting to be scrutinised and set up the Transparency Implementation Group (TIG).

Mr Justice Mostyn’s Campaign for Greater Transparency

Senior judges in the Financial Remedy Court (FRC) are not in agreement as to how to strike the right balance between transparency and privacy in matters such as who can attend hearings, what documents should be provided to reporters, and retaining parties’ anonymity. Mr Justice Mostyn has made waves by unequivocally asserting in a series of judgments since late 2021 that the FRC has been getting the law wrong for decades. Mostyn J’s position is that, whilst Family Court proceedings sit in “private” (as opposed to “open” court, like the majority of court divisions), that does not in and of itself require reporting restrictions or that the parties be anonymised when the judgment is published on a public database. He has made statements such as:

“Had a member of the press or a legal blogger attended I consider that they could have reported everything that they heard during the proceedings” (Aylward-Davies v Chesterman [2022]);
“The correct question is not: ‘Why is it in the public interest that the parties should be named?’ but rather: ‘Why is it in the public interest that the parties should be anonymous?’” (Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2022]); and
“if very rich businessmen are in court fighting at vast expense with their ex-spouses over millions, then the public has the right to know who they are and what they are fighting about. The judgment should therefore name names. Redactions can be made of commercially sensitive information, but…the redactions should never obscure the way the court has decided the case” (Gallagher v Gallagher (No. 1) (Reporting Restrictions) [2022]).

“Is it fair that one party’s poor behaviour could result in the other party’s identification?”

You might notice something that the above three cases have in common: you can read the names of the parties. That is because Mostyn J did not anonymise his judgments. The vast majority of financial remedy judgments heard by judges other than Mostyn J, however, continue to be anonymised. The lead FRC judge, Mr Justice Peel, has been the most prolific publisher of judgments since November 2021 and all have been anonymised. Since parties have no control over which judge hears their case, they face a bit of a lottery as to the publication protections they might be afforded.

The TIG Report

TIG has just reported its findings on all issues of transparency as they relate to the FRC. Acknowledging Mostyn J’s judgments, it states “it is not for this report to set out what we consider the law to be on any particular, controversial, point. That must be a matter for the Court of Appeal. We acknowledge that there are different approaches to certain issues by different judges at High Court level and that this is far from ideal…it will be for others to decide whether the conclusions we reach should be implemented”.

The TIG report’s most critical recommendations can be summarised as follows:

Attendance at hearings

Cases should continue to be heard in private – ie, the only individuals permitted to attend are the parties, their representatives, and accredited journalists. Efforts should be made to better inform practitioners and judges on what to do if a reporter attends their hearing.

Reporting

Reporters attending hearings currently cannot see any case documents without specific permission of the Court, meaning that the hearing is often impossible for them to follow. The report recommends that, when a reporter attends, a standard Reporting Order be made by the judge which:

permits reporting of what the reporter witnesses, subject to anonymisation and protection against intrusive and personal identification; and
entitles the reporter to see the parties’ position statements, together with the “ES1” (a brief case summary document) – reporters cannot publish any information that would breach the Reporting Order, even if it appears in a provided document.

Anonymity in published judgments

This is at the centre of Mostyn J’s standpoint and is arguably the most controversial issue. The report considers that “the default position should be one of anonymity”, but “there will be cases in which the presumption of anonymity will not be upheld”, which is a matter for the judge to decide on a case-by-case basis. Examples might include “situations of poor behaviour, either within the proceedings (by way of litigation conduct) or outside the proceedings in appropriate cases”, or where the public interest in identification outweighs the privacy justifications. The report also strongly encourages judges at all levels, not just High Court, to publish their judgments, to reset the imbalanced focus on “big money” cases heard by the High Court.

The TIG report’s recommendations, if implemented, would undoubtedly provide greater clarity as to what parties to FRC proceedings can expect from a transparency and privacy perspective. The idea, however, that a party’s conduct could lead to a loss of their anonymity leaves much room for judicial discretion. What sort of behaviour outside of proceedings should this cover, what is the threshold for “poor behaviour”, and is it fair that one party’s poor behaviour could result in the other party’s identification? The question of transparency is by no means answered and we eagerly await a Court of Appeal case on the topic. In the meanwhile we will report back on the extent to which the TIG report recommendations are implemented by the Family Division.

What does Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 say?

Needless to say, Schedule 1 also comes into play in circumstances where a child has been born to a mother, even after a very brief or fleeting relationship with the father.

It is possible to apply for the following orders:

Periodical monthly maintenance payments for yourself on the child’s behalf (or to an adult child directly, where applicable);
Secured periodical payments for yourself on the child’s behalf (or to an adult child directly, where applicable);
Lump sum for yourself on the child’s behalf (or to an adult child directly, if applicable);
Settlement of property for the benefit of the child, reverting to the paying party at the end of a specified term; and/or
A transfer of property outright to you on the child’s behalf (often held on trust for them) (or to an adult child directly), but this is only likely to happen in very specific and limited circumstances.

Who can make an application under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989?

The Court can make a periodic payment order in respect of:

Topping up the CMS maximum assessment amount, if the non-resident parent’s income is greater than £156,000 gross per annum. The Court will need to be satisfied that the circumstances of the case make it fair and reasonable for a top up order to be made;
A regular payment for school fees or vocational training; and/or
Meeting any reasonably foreseeable recurring expenses associated with the child’s disability (if they have one).

When would a Schedule 1 lump sum order be made?

How does the Court decide whether an order should be made?

The Court will also consider very similar factors to those listed under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, namely:

The child’s financial requirements;
Any physical or mental disabilities relating to the child;
The current and future income, earning capacity, and financial needs and obligations of the parents;
How long the child is expected to be in education or vocational training;
The income, earning capacity, and property of the child; and
The way the child was being or is expected to be educated.

How long do Schedule 1 orders last?

Where does this leave us?

To discuss any points mentioned in this article, please contact our office.